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GOD’S STANDING TO FORGIVE
Brandon Warmke

It is generally thought that we cannot forgive people for things they do to others. I cannot forgive you for lying to your mother, for instance. I lack standing
to do so. But many people believe that God can forgive us for things we do to
others. How is this possible? This is the question I wish to explore. Call it the
problem of divine standing. I begin by cataloging the various ways one can have
standing to forgive a wrongdoer. I then provide two solutions to the problem
of divine standing.

I. Introduction
Consider two cases:
LUCY: I lie to my brother, telling him I bought a gift for our parents
when I did not do so. Realizing my guilt, I ask my new plumber
Lucy to forgive me for my lie. Lucy forgives me for lying to my
brother.
GOD:

I lie to my brother, telling him I bought a gift for our parents
when I did not do so. Realizing my guilt, I ask God to forgive
me for my lie. God forgives me for lying to my brother.

The claim that Lucy could forgive me for lying to my brother will, I think,
strike most people as strange. And yet for many people, it will not seem
nearly so strange to think that God could do so. An apparently central
tenet of all three Abrahamic faiths is that God can and does forgive human
persons for the wrong things they do to one another. But how is this possible? Because I lied to my brother—and not to Lucy—we are inclined to
think that Lucy cannot forgive me. She lacks standing to do so. But then
why think that God can forgive us for the wrongs we do to others? Just
as I did not lie to Lucy about the gift, I did not lie to God about the gift. If
Lucy does not have the standing to forgive me, how does God? This is the
question I wish to explore: How could God have the standing to forgive us
for the things we do to one another? Call this the problem of divine standing.1
1
To avoid confusion, I stress that my question is how God could have the standing to
forgive us for the wrongs we do to others. Sometimes I will simplify and speak about “God’s
standing to forgive,” but unless otherwise specified this should be taken to refer to God’s
forgiveness for interpersonal human wrongs.
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I begin with some preliminaries. First, I will assume for present purposes that God’s forgiveness is not supremely mysterious. Some may be
content to respond to the problem of divine standing by claiming that it
is indeed a mystery, but that there is little, if anything, we can say about
God that would explain how such forgiveness is possible. I adopt a methodology that allows serious and sustained inquiry into divine forgiveness.
If it turns out that this methodology is misguided, or we find no rationally
satisfying solution to the problem, we may still perhaps learn something
illuminating along the way.
Second, throughout I will use the term “wrongdoer” to refer to an agent
who is a putative candidate for being forgiven. I use the terms “wrong”
and “wrongdoing” to refer to the conduct (i.e., acts, omissions, or the consequences of acts or omissions) for which a wrongdoer is forgiven. I will
say that we forgive each other for “wrongs.” In using this term, I do not
mean only to refer to failures to comply with moral principles or rules. As
to whether we may be forgiven for morally permissible conduct that is
morally bad I remain neutral.
Third, let us distinguish the issue of divine standing from other questions we can ask about God’s forgiveness. One such question concerns
the nature of God’s forgiveness. What is God’s forgiveness? If and when
God forgives, what does God do?2 Another question concerns the norms
bearing on God’s forgiveness. Under what conditions is God’s forgiveness
morally good, right, or just? And what reasons or motivations would a
morally perfect being have in forgiving? However, to ask how God is in a
position to forgive me for my lie is to ask a different kind of question, one
about standing. To say that someone has standing to forgive is to say that
they have the power to forgive (whether or not they do so, and whether
or not their doing so is morally good).3 If Lucy lacks standing to forgive
me, then forgiving is not on the table for her; she is not a candidate for
forgiving. Consider an analogy: a priest and I might both sincerely utter
“I now pronounce you husband and wife” to a couple seeking to wed.
Only the priest would have married the couple, however, because only the
priest has the power, or standing, to do so. Similarly, Lucy and my brother
might both sincerely utter “I forgive you.” Only my brother would have
forgiven me because only my brother has the power, or standing, to do so.
We can distinguish two further questions about standing. One question
asks who has the standing to forgive, either in some particular case or in
general. Call this the identification question about standing. Answers to this
2
I have explored the nature question in Warmke, “Divine Forgiveness I” and “Divine
Forgiveness II.” See also Adams, “Forgiveness: A Christian Model”; Bash, Forgiveness; Brien,
“Can God Forgive Us Our Trespasses?”; Drabkin, “The Nature of God’s Love and Forgiveness”; Geuras, “In Defense of Divine Forgiveness”; Londey, “Can God Forgive Us Our
Trespasses?”; Mackintosh, Christian Experience of Forgiveness; Minas, “God and Forgiveness”;
Scheiber, “May God Forgive?”; Strabbing, “Divine Forgiveness and Reconciliation”; and
Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement.
3
As far as I know, Jeffrie Murphy was the first to introduce “standing” as way of talking
about who is a candidate for forgiving (Murphy and Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy, 174).
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question might involve simply listing individual persons who have the
standing to forgive in a particular case. More general (and perhaps more
illuminating) answers may involve providing a set of features, such that
if some individual possessed them, then that person would thereby have
the standing to forgive. For example, it might be thought that one has
standing to forgive a wrongdoer only if one is the victim of that wrongdoing (in some relevant sense of “victim”). Jeffrie Murphy expresses this
view when he writes,
I do not have standing to resent or forgive you unless I have myself been the
victim of your wrongdoing. I may forgive you for embezzling my funds;
but it would be ludicrous for me, for example, to claim that I had decided to
forgive Hitler for what he did to the Jews. I lack the proper standing for this.
Thus, I may legitimately resent (and hence consider forgiving) only wrong
done to me.4

In contrast, it might be thought that there are multiple features such that
possessing any one of them gives someone the standing to forgive. For
example, you might hold that someone has the standing to forgive a
wrongdoer if either (a) one is the victim of the wrongdoing; (b) one feels
resentment toward the wrongdoer because of what she did to the victim;
or (c) one has a certain kind of relationship with the victim (such as an
especially close friendship).
A distinct question concerning standing asks why it is that some and not
others have standing. Call this the explanatory question. Suppose, for example, that only victims of wrongdoing have the standing to forgive. Why
is that so? One way of answering the explanatory question is to advert
to the nature of forgiveness itself; there is something about the phenomenon of forgiveness that dictates who can and cannot forgive. Suppose, for
example, that forgiving requires the overcoming of resentment, and that
only victims of wrongdoing (as opposed to third parties) can feel resentment. This would explain why only victims have the standing to forgive,
for only they meet a requirement on forgiveness itself. On the other hand,
there may be some other kind of explanation for why only some have
standing to forgive—an explanation that doesn’t bottom out in the constitutive features of forgiveness itself.5
Murphy and Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy, 21, emphasis in original.
Note the following point of clarification. Philosophers writing on moral blame have
asked their own questions about standing: the identification question as to who has standing
to blame, either in some particular case or in general; and the explanatory question as to why
some people rather than others have the standing to blame. It is crucial to note, however, that
in the blame literature, “standing” is understood differently. To see why, notice that many
people claim that one lacks standing to blame if one’s blame would be hypocritical (e.g., I
blame you for smoking when I am myself a smoker). To say that one lacks standing to blame
is not to say that one does not have the power to blame. Rather, it is to say that were one to
blame, one’s blame would be morally impermissible or inappropriate. When we claim that
someone lacks standing to forgive, however, we mean that she cannot forgive. Noting this
difference between blame-standing and forgiveness-standing is crucial to avoid confusion.
See Todd, “A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame,” for further discussion.
4
5
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With those matters out of the way, here is how we will proceed. In Section II, I catalog various forms of standing to forgive. One may think of
these forms of standing as comprising different answers to the identification question. In Section III, I assess these forms of standing as potential
solutions to the problem of divine standing. In Sections IV and V, I take
these results into consideration and offer two solutions to the problem.
One solution concedes that God lacks standing to forgive but argues that
this is no problem. The other solution shows that God does have standing,
identifies which form of standing God has, and explains why it might be
that God is able to forgive in this way.
II. Varieties of Standing
II.A. Direct Standing
Consider a case of wrongdoing and subsequent forgiveness between two
very close friends. Alfred lies to Betty, a lie (we can suppose) that does not
affect anyone else. In such a case, Betty was directly wronged by Alfred.
Though I will not attempt a full account of what it means to be directly
wronged by someone, the general idea is that for Betty to be directly
wronged by Alfred means that Alfred’s conduct itself constituted a wrong
against Betty; he failed Betty, morally speaking. One may be directly
wronged in many ways. One may be lied to, cheated on, have something
stolen, be kidnapped, or be assaulted. And as stipulated in our case, Betty
was the only one wronged by Alfred’s lie. We may say that Betty has exclusive direct standing to forgive. Her standing to forgive is direct insofar as
she was directly wronged, and it is exclusive because she is the only one
with the standing to forgive Alfred for that wrong.
It is possible, however, for a single act to result in multiple victims who
each have standing to forgive. Suppose that Alfred addressed his lie to
Betty and Jill, attempting to deceive them both. Betty and Jill are each directly wronged by Alfred, yet neither has exclusive standing to forgive.
Call such cases of standing shared direct standing.
Yet there is another way for multiple people to have direct standing to forgive a wrongdoer for something the wrongdoer does. Suppose that Alfred
lies to Betty, as in the original case. Suppose also that Alfred has made a
promise to his mother, Sue, to no longer tell lies. By conducting himself in
a certain way, Alfred has at once lied to Betty and broken a promise to Sue.
Here, it seems to me, both Betty and Sue have been wronged directly, but
in different ways. Betty is the victim of a lie; Sue is the victim of a broken
promise (Alfred, we might say, “let her down”). Here, both Betty and Sue
are in a position to forgive Alfred for his action, albeit for different kinds of
wrongs. Betty may forgive him for the lie, Sue for the broken promise. Call
the standing that both Betty and Sue possess distinct direct standing.6
6
It might be thought that this case is not best categorized as a case of distinct direct
standing, but rather just a matter of two cases of exclusive direct standing. Each is wronged
directly, but only Betty can forgive Alfred for the lie and only Sue can forgive for the broken
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II.B. Indirect Standing
Suppose that Alfred lies to Betty and this results in Betty being an hour
late to pick up her brother Todd. Alfred did not lie to Todd, but by lying
to Betty there is a straightforward sense in which this resulted in a wrong
being done to Todd. Had Alfred not lied to Betty, she would have picked
up Todd on time. Alfred is responsible for making Betty late to pick up
Todd and therefore responsible for wasting Todd’s time. It would be appropriate for Alfred to apologize both to Betty and Todd, and it is open
to each of them to decide whether or not to accept Alfred’s apology and
forgive him.
Here, while Betty was directly wronged and so has direct standing to
forgive, Todd was not directly wronged. Rather, Alfred’s lie to Betty led
to Todd’s being wronged indirectly. And because it would be fitting for
Todd to blame Alfred, and for Alfred to apologize to Todd, it is plausible
to think that Todd also has standing to forgive Alfred, who is responsible
for wasting his time.7 Call this indirect standing.8
II.C. Proxy Standing
Though controversial, it may be possible to forgive a wrongdoer on behalf
of someone else. Suppose Ted’s adult daughter Maria is killed by a drunk
driver. If Ted can forgive the drunk driver on behalf of Maria, he does so in
virtue of possessing proxy standing. It is important to distinguish (a) Ted’s
proxy standing to forgive the driver on behalf of Maria from (b) whatever
direct or indirect standing Ted might possess that would enable him to
forgive the driver for killing his daughter. It might be that when people
promise. I take this point, and whether it is helpful to distinguish these two kinds of standing
may just depend on how we decide to individuate actions and wrongdoings. The reason I
think cases of distinct direct standing are interesting is that it appears there is one action of
Alfred’s that constitutes two different wrongs. Betty and Sue each forgive Alfred for the same
token action, but not for the same token wrong. Such a case is, I think, interestingly different
from a case in which Alfred lies to Betty and then later on that day breaks a promise to Sue.
In the former case, we have two token wrongs attached to the same token action, and in the
latter case we have two token wrongs each attached to distinct token actions.
7
Consider the real-life case of Anne Marie Hochhalter, who was left paralyzed in the 1999
Columbine High School shooting. She wrote to Susan Klebold, mother of one of the shooters,
to say “I have forgiven you and only wish you the best.” Presumably, Hochhalter was taking
herself not to be forgiving Susan Klebold for doing the shooting, but for playing some role
in her son’s upbringing. If such cases of forgiveness are possible, Hochhalter’s standing to
forgive appears to be of the indirect variety. (See Kim 2016.) One might reply that Hochhalter
was simply mistaken in thinking that she could forgive Susan Klebold in this way. Perhaps
that is correct. For now, I see no harm in exploring the possibility of indirect standing.
8
As with direct standing, indirect standing could be exclusive or shared. If, for example,
Alfred’s lie resulted in Betty being late to pick up both Todd and his friend Beavis, then each
could have shared indirect standing to forgive. Once we allow for indirect standing to forgive, difficult questions arise. Suppose that Todd’s being picked up late leads him to default
on a loan to his co-worker Joan, which means Joan’s daughter Mary’s car is seized, and so on.
Can Joan forgive Alfred? Can Mary? I leave these matters unsettled. Notice, however, that
this “dispersion” of standing affects direct standing, as well (see n. 33). Further, it may not
always be clear whether a case of standing should be classified as direct or indirect (or some
hybrid of the two). The lines may be blurry, and there may be overlap.
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very close to us (like our children) are seriously wronged, we are also
wronged. But this would not invoke proxy standing. X’s forgiving Y on
behalf of Z for what Y did to Z is not the same as X’s forgiving Y for what
Y did to Z (or for what this thereby did to X).
Even those sympathetic to the possibility of the proxy standing delimit
the class of people who qualify for it.9 If you lie to your best friend, it is
hard to see how a random refrigerator salesperson from England could
have the standing to forgive you on your friend’s behalf. What kind of
special relationship is required? A close familial tie or close friendship
would be the clearest examples of the required special relationship in
order to have proxy standing. This is why it is plausible to think that Ted
could forgive on behalf of his daughter Maria, but that Maria’s hedge fund
manager could not.
II.D. Third Party Standing
Finally, consider third party standing. Third party standing enables one to
engage in third party forgiveness. What is labeled “third party” forgiveness in the forgiveness literature is often a source of confusion. Charles
Griswold rightly points out that some forms of standing are misleadingly
labeled “third party.” For example, he asks us to imagine the murder of
a loved one, and the question of whether to forgive presents itself to us
in light of the loss we’ve sustained. “This sort of case,” he says, “is not a
matter of third-party forgiveness.”10 The standing to forgive that would
accrue to such a person would be (to put it in our above terminology) of
the direct or indirect variety, depending on how the case is fleshed out.
Griswold’s own view is that third party forgiveness involves the following:
A situation in which the question of forgiveness arises in light of your indignation at the loss suffered by another person, thanks to someone else’s actions: here the matter concerns your forgiving their offender on their behalf
for the harm done to them (not to you).11

Yet because Griswold has in mind forgiving “on behalf” of the victim, this
is instead best thought of as proxy standing.12
I reserve the designation “third party standing” for another possible
(albeit controversial) form of standing in which a non-victim forgives a
wrongdoer, but not on behalf of the victim. We may distinguish between a
9
See Griswold, Forgiveness, 119. However, also see below for clarification about Griswold’s view.
10
Griswold, Forgiveness, 117.
11
Griswold, Forgiveness, 117.
12
Griswold, Forgiveness, 119. Griswold argues that to engage in what he calls third party
forgiveness, the forgiver can do so only if she has “standing,” and one receives such standing
only if one has an “identification with the victim.” How does one come to identify with the
victim? According to Griswold, one identifies with a victim only if one has (1) “ties of care for
the victim”; and (2) “reasonably detailed knowledge not only of the offender’s wrong-doing
and contrition, but especially of the victim” (Forgiveness, 119).
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non-victim being able to forgive a wrongdoer on behalf of the victim and a
non-victim being able to forgive a wrongdoer full stop. One could, it seems
to me, have one kind of standing but not the other. I identify as third party
standing what both Glen Pettigrove and Margaret Urban Walker have in
mind in their recent discussions of third party forgiveness.13 Such cases,
Walker writes, involve “the scenario in which A forgives the offender B for
something B did to the victim C, where A is not plausibly seen as a fellow
victim, and where A forgives B on A’s own behalf, not on behalf of C or
anyone else who might be a victim of the wrong.”14 Such a putative forgiver, she says, is one who “suffered no wrong” by the offender’s actions.15
This putative standing to forgive, therefore, is not reducible to any of the
aforementioned varieties.
We arrive at four basic forms of standing: (1) direct standing (and its
attendant varieties); (2) indirect standing; (3) proxy standing; and (4) third
party standing. There is at least one other potential form of standing, but it
is not relevant to the question of how God could forgive us for the wrongs
we do to others, so I will set it aside.16 Do any of these forms explain how
God has standing to forgive? To this question we turn.
III. Assessing the Options
III.A. Divine Forgiveness and Direct Standing?
Consider whether God has direct standing to forgive us for the wrongs
we do to others. Recall that in order to have direct standing to forgive an
agent for something, one must have been directly wronged by that agent.
And so if God has standing to forgive me for, say, my lie to my brother,
that lie must in some sense also be a wrong against or an affront to God.
One way that God might have direct standing in such cases is if God
has exclusive standing to do so. That is, only God has the standing to forgive me for my lie to my brother. This is implausible, not only because in
See Pettigrove, “The Standing to Forgive”; and Walker, “Third Parties.”
Walker, “Third Parties,” 495. Pettigrove has in mind the same logic of third party forgiveness: “Forgiving B for a wrong he has done to C is not the same as forgiving B for C” (“The
Standing to Forgive,” 591, italics original). I take the italicized “for” to mean “on behalf of.”
15
Walker, “Third Parties,” 496.
16
For example, it may be possible to forgive oneself for something. This might happen in
two ways. First, you might forgive yourself for something you did to yourself, such as the
self-infliction of wounds. Here, though, one might argue that, as it turns out, one has direct
standing to forgive in virtue of being directly wronged (the wrongdoer and the victim just
happen to be the same person). Perhaps the more interesting case is that of the wrongdoer
forgiving herself for something she did to someone else, for in this case, the wrongdoer is not
indirectly or directly wronged in the above senses. If such cases of forgiveness are possible
(and some have argued they are—see Milam, “How is Self-Forgiveness Possible?”), then we
need a variety of standing that allows for them. Call this reflexive standing. Since our question
is how God would forgive us (and I take it that we and God (or the Godhead) are separate
persons), reflexive standing is not an option. It might be thought that reflexive standing is a
species of third party standing: In both cases a non-victim has standing to forgive the wrongdoer. Yet only in the reflexive case is the non-victim identical to the wrongdoer. This unique
feature may require special explanation regarding the possibility of standing.
13
14
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this specific case it rules out the possibility that my brother could forgive
me for the lie, but also because, were we to generalize, it would mean
that human persons never have the standing to forgive one another. Only
God does. This would effectively make interpersonal human forgiveness
impossible. I find it difficult to take this view seriously. Not only does it
seem obviously true that sometimes humans can forgive one another, but
also we are taught to forgive one another in Scripture (see, e.g., Matthew
6:12,15; Mark 11:25). I therefore set aside exclusive direct standing as a
solution to the problem of divine standing.17
What about shared direct standing? Here, if you recall, an action constitutes multiple wrongs of the same type against multiple victims. Each
victim has the standing to forgive the wrongdoer for the same type of
wrong occasioned by the act in question. One act of lying, for example,
gives two victims of my lie standing to forgive me for the lie. How might
this explain how God could forgive us for interpersonal wrongs? In my
lying to my brother, I would be creating two victims who each have direct
standing to forgive me: my brother and God. Immediately, this avoids the
problem of exclusive direct standing, for it allows that others besides God
can have the standing to forgive me. However, this strategy gets something else wrong; it misconstrues the nature of the wrongdoing vis à vis
God. This is because every wrong that I commit against my neighbor is not
the same type of wrong that I commit against God. To punch a neighbor in
the face is not to punch God in face. To murder an enemy is not to murder
God. (Perhaps clearer examples could be given; I will not do so.) The point
is that the wrong against our neighbor is not necessarily (and perhaps
rarely, if ever) of the same kind as our wrong against God. Shared direct
standing will not do.
Distinct direct standing, however, can do better. It gives multiple victims who were directly wronged the standing to forgive. It also allows
that those victims may forgive the wrongdoer for different types of
wrongs. Consider my lie to my brother. In this one act, I have committed
two wrongs, one against my brother and one against God. But because we
have allowed that one act can constitute two different kinds of wrongs,
we avoid the above problem with shared direct standing. My brother can
forgive me for lying to him, and God can forgive me for, say, disobeying

17
In recent work, Martha Nussbaum claims that the Christian understanding of forgiveness attributes to God exclusive direct standing to forgive. In the “transition from Judaism
to Christianity,” she says, “the independent human-human forgiveness process, already deemphasized in Judaism, simply drops away: all forgiveness is really from God (sometimes
mediated by clergy). If you square your relationship with God, then the other person is
by definition satisfied, and you do not need to engage in separate negotiations with that
person” (Anger and Forgiveness, 69). But this is an egregious misunderstanding of Christianity. Christ commands interpersonal forgiveness (Matt. 18:21–35), Paul encourages it (Col.
3:12–13), and, as noted above, Christians are positively taught to forgive other humans (Matt.
6:9–15). Perhaps most forceful is Christ’s teaching at Mark 11:25 (NLT): “And when you stand
praying, if you hold anything against anyone, forgive them, so that your Father in heaven
may forgive you your sins.”
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God’s command not to lie.18 This looks like a promising solution to the
problem of God’s standing to forgive.
Yet here is a further difficulty. If there are two wrongs—one against
God that only God has standing to forgive and one against our neighbor
that only our neighbor can forgive—then it appears that there are some
wrongs that God can never forgive. This is because God does not have
direct standing to forgive me for lying to my brother. God can forgive me
only for disobeying the relevant command. It seems to me, however, that
many people who believe that God can forgive them for what they have
done, believe (and desire) not just that God can forgive them for some
of their wrongs, but for all of them. Many, I think, pray to God, not only
that they would be forgiven for breaking God’s commands, but that God
would forgive them for lying to their brother.
Of course, there is a sense in which, on this view, God can forgive people
for what they do to others. The disobedience for which God is putatively
able to forgive us is something that implicates us in doing something to
another person. This much is true. But there is a difference between forgiving someone for disobedience (in treating another person in this way)
and forgiving them for the wrong done to the other. A teacher might forgive a student for breaking her appointed classroom rules, but the teacher
cannot forgive the student for lying to a fellow student. Only the student
can do that. This brings into relief a problem for any proposed solution to
the problem of divine standing that invokes a “two wrongs” approach. If
we posit multiple wrongs, one of which God can forgive, there remains a
wrong that God cannot forgive, and perhaps will never be forgiven (if the
relevant human with standing to forgive never forgives).19 If we want to
preserve the notion that God can forgive any wrong committed, then we
cannot construe God’s standing to forgive simply as a matter of possessing
direct standing.20
III.B. Divine Forgiveness and Indirect Standing?
What about indirect standing? If we want both human victims and God
to be able to forgive a wrongdoer, we need not insist that God and human

18
For present purposes, I do not think it matters how we construe the specific way in
which such actions constitute wrongs against God. What matters is that God can forgive us
for something other than the wrong against a fellow human person. I’ll use disobedience
simply as a placeholder. It may be thought that God cannot be wronged (see, e.g., Minas,
“God and Forgiveness.”). I will not address this possibility here, and I simply assume that
God can be wronged in whatever sense that is relevant to forgiveness. But for discussion of
the various responses to Minas, including my own, see Warmke, “Divine Forgiveness I.”
19
Notice that the problem also faces views of divine standing that invoke shared direct
standing as discussed above.
20
It might be thought that with additional theological premises, we could avoid this conclusion. For example, suppose one adopted a kind of eschatological universalism such that
eventually all human persons will be reconciled with their wrongdoers and forgive them.
But this would only secure the claim that all wrongs are (eventually) forgiven. It would not
give the result that God can forgive everyone for every wrong they have committed.
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victims both have direct standing to do so. One or the other could instead
have indirect standing. There are at least two ways this could work.
First, when I lie to my brother, this results in an indirect wrong against
God. On this view, God has been wronged, but only indirectly, through a
direct wronging of someone else. In other words, when I lie to my brother
I directly wrong him. This gives him direct standing to forgive me. In directly wronging him, however, this results in indirectly wronging God.
This gives God indirect standing to forgive me.
Second, we might argue that when I wrong God, this results in an indirect wrong against my brother. My brother has indeed been wronged,
but only indirectly, through a direct wronging of God. In other words,
when I disobey God I directly wrong God. This gives God direct standing
to forgive me. In directly wronging God, however, this results in my indirectly wronging my brother. This gives my brother indirect standing to
forgive me.21
On either reading, however, we are still left the general “two wrongs”
problem encountered above. On the first indirect strategy, there remains
the question of how God could forgive me for my lie to my brother. When
Alfred lies to Betty and this results in her being late to pick up Todd, it is
true that Todd gets standing to forgive Alfred. But he does not get standing
to forgive Alfred for lying to Betty. Rather, he gets standing to forgive him
for something that is expressible by a statement such as “I forgive you for
delaying my pick up” or “I forgive you for making me wait in the rain.” A
similar problem affects the second indirect strategy. Even if God can forgive
me for that direct wrong against God, this would not mean that God could
also forgive me for the indirect wrong against my brother. In either case,
there are interpersonal wrongs that God does not have standing to forgive.22
III.C. Divine Forgiveness and Proxy Standing?
The options canvassed thus far attempt to ground God’s standing in the
fact that God was wronged. But as we noted in Section II, there are putative
21
In the previous section, we developed the notion of being indirectly wronged (and possessing indirect standing to forgive) in what looked to be causal terms: Alfred lied to Betty
and this caused her to be late in picking up Todd. Alfred’s wronging Betty causes Todd to be
wronged, too. I am not sure it makes sense to put matters in this way when it comes to that
matter of wronging God. To whatever extent it makes sense to say that we wrong God, it is
strange to say either (a) that my lying to my brother causes God to be wronged; or (b) that
my disobeying God causes my brother to be wronged. But we need not understand indirect
wrongness in terms of causation. We might simply say that being indirectly wronged by s
is the result of someone else being directly wronged by s. The relevant claim, I think, is that
being indirectly wronged by a person somehow depends on someone else being directly
wronged by that same person.
22
I briefly mention two further potential problems with the indirect strategies. The first
strategy is open to the charge that it miscasts the nature of my wrong against God. Is God
wronged as a result of lying to my brother? Or is my wrong against God immediate and
direct? The latter strikes me as the correct interpretation. The second strategy doesn’t strike
me to be an accurate read on the situation either. This view would have it that my wronging
my brother is a result of my wronging God. But here again, it seems that I have immediately
and directly wronged each.
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varieties of standing that do not require that one be wronged by X in order
to forgive X for that wrong. One such way is to forgive on behalf of the
victim. Does it make sense to explain God’s standing to forgive us for
wrongs we do to others by adverting to proxy standing? I can’t see how.
One reason is this: typically, proxy standing is in play because those
who have (or would have had) direct or indirect standing to forgive are
not actually able to forgive. They are incapacitated or deceased, for example. In such cases, the standing to forgive can be transferred to a proxy
in special relationship with the victim. If this is how the story is supposed
to go, then as a general theory about how God has standing to forgive,
this will not do. Perhaps God has proxy standing to forgive us when our
victims are incapacitated or deceased, but this would not explain God’s
standing in the other cases.
Second, if God’s standing is proxy, then the best we can reasonably
do is to ask that God forgive us on behalf of our victim. Yet this miscasts
the nature of what I believe many to be asking for when they ask God
to forgive them for such interpersonal wrongs. They are not asking God
to forgive them in lieu of their victim’s forgiveness. I may think that my
brother is perfectly capable of forgiving me and yet think that God can do
so as well, and that this has nothing to do with God’s forgiving me on his
behalf. Proxy standing does not sufficiently capture the way that God is
thought to forgive us for our interpersonal wrongs—God forgives us on
God’s own behalf, not on anyone else’s.
III.D. Divine Forgiveness and Third Party Standing?
If God had third party standing to forgive us our interpersonal wrongs,
then we could satisfy what I take to be the primary desiderata for a solution to the problem of divine standing. We could affirm the following:
(1) humans are wronged and have direct standing to forgive; (2) God is
wronged and has direct standing to forgive; and (3) all wrongs can be forgiven by God. Even though we would advance a “two wrongs” solution,
if God could forgive me for lying to my brother as a third party, then there
would be no wrongs God cannot forgive. All would be well.
The trouble is that it is very difficult to explain how third parties have
standing to forgive. Indeed, this difficulty was built into the way I set
up the problem of divine standing at the outset. If Lucy, as a third party,
cannot forgive me for lying to my brother, how could any third party?
How could God? For now I simply point out that third party standing, if
it offers a solution to the problem of divine standing at all, does not offer
an easy one. I will return to this issue in Section V.
IV. Solution 1—Concession and Comfort
Our goal has been to account for the way that God has standing to forgive
us for interpersonal wrongs. The assumption has been that God does have
such standing. Yet the prospects for an acceptable solution to the problem
of divine standing look dim. In the next section I will defend what I take
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to be the best strategy for solving the problem. Before doing so, I pursue a
different response to the problem of divine standing: conceding that God
cannot have the standing to forgive interpersonal wrongs. For many, this
will be an entirely unsatisfactory response. I share the concern. But I want
to offer comfort for those who either find this response attractive or who
worry that ultimately, we may not be able to give a satisfying account of
God’s standing to forgive interpersonal wrongs.
Here is the picture. When I lie to my brother, I commit two wrongs: I
lie to him and I, say, disobey God. But just like my brother cannot forgive
me for my disobedience to God, God cannot forgive me for my lie to my
brother. We can think of the matter as involving two cases of distinct direct
standing. This is the concession: there is no “solution” to the problem of
divine standing.
Here is the comfort: Upon careful reflection, there is little reason to
expect that God would have the standing to forgive us for the things we
do to others. And since there is little reason to expect this of God, there
is little reason to be disappointed to find out it is so. But why shouldn’t
we expect God to be able to do this? It is important to keep in mind that
there are just some things God cannot do. That is okay. God cannot sin or
self-annihilate. Nor can God possess any standing—such as the standing
to repent—that would require previous fault on God’s part.23 The standing
to forgive human interpersonal wrongs may just be one of those things
that God cannot possess. This may seem more plausible when we remind
ourselves of the relational nature of forgiveness. The reason that others
cannot forgive me for lying to my brother is just the fact that they are
not members of that relationship in which the lie was told. But it is no
indictment against God if God is not a member of that relationship and so
cannot do things that only the members of that relationship have standing
to do. Just like God does not possess the “standing” to keep your marriage
vow to your spouse (only you have “standing” to do that), there are other
things that God cannot do because of their inherently relational nature.
Possessing the standing to forgive humans for their interpersonal wrongs
may simply be one of them. If so, then God’s lack of standing to forgive
you for lying to your wife is no less a problem than God’s lack of standing
to keep your wedding vows to your wife.
It might be objected that these cases are not relevantly similar. Keeping
wedding vows is not something we would expect (or want!) God to do or
be able to do. But this is not so with forgiveness. We should expect God to
be able to forgive us for the things we do to others.
In reply, the concessive comforter should say the following. First, she
should remind the critic that there is a sense in which God does forgive
her for her interpersonal wrongs. Because she (by lying) acts in a way that
disobeys God, God can forgive her for this. Yet God can only forgive her
for the things for which she does in relation to God, and this is why God
23

I thank Mark Murphy for the example.
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can only forgive us for the disobedience, and not for the lying. The critic
can be comforted with the thought that God can forgive all wrongs committed against God. Every single one of them.
Second, the comforter should ask the critic to consider a benefit of a
theory that limits God standing to forgive, namely that it secures for the
victims of interpersonal wrongs a unique kind of standing to forgive. Why
is this a benefit? Because it offers a way of explaining why, on the Christian view at any rate, it is so important to forgive those who wrong us.24
Victims of typical interpersonal wrongs are the only ones who can forgive
their wrongdoers for those wrongs. So if forgiveness for a wrong is to take
place at all, it will only take place if the victim forgives the wrongdoer for
it. God will not and cannot do it instead of me or on my behalf.
Third, recall that one concern with certain kinds of “two wrong” strategies is that they make it in principle impossible for some wrongs to be
forgiven by God. And if there are some wrongs that God cannot forgive,
then there will be “sins” that cannot and never will be forgiven. However,
the comforter will want to show the critic that worries about perpetually
“unforgiven wrongs” can be overblown. For insofar as a wrong is a wrong
against God, it can be forgiven by God—there are no wrongs against God
that God cannot forgive. And so as far as God’s relationship with us is concerned, there are no “remainder” wrongs that must remain unforgiven.
That other people may not forgive us for the wrongs we commit against
them is something that God has allowed. But whether we are forgiven by
others, it might argued, has no bearing on whether God can forgive us.25
God extends the offer of forgiveness to all those who would ask.
V. Solution 2—God’s Third Party Standing
I can sometimes work myself into feeling the comfort in concession. But
it still seems to me that it would be better—in some respect or other—if
God could forgive me for my interpersonal wrongs. I confess the feeling (I
am not sure it is much more than that) that there must be a way of making
sense of this possibility.
So in what follows I will sketch a way of securing God’s standing
to forgive. Here are the basics of the solution, which is, except for one
amendment, much the same at Concession and Comfort. When I wrong
my brother, I commit two wrongs: I lie to him and I, say, disobey God.
My brother has direct standing to forgive me for the lie because he was
directly wronged by the lie. And God has direct standing to forgive me for
my disobedience because God was directly wronged by it. Now here is the
difference: God can also forgive me for my lie to my brother because God
possesses third party standing to do so.
I am grateful to Matthew Benton for suggesting this thought.
Some biblical texts appear, on their face, to complicate matters: “But if you do not forgive others their sins, your Father will not forgive your sins” (Matt. 6:15). Cf. Mark 11:25:
“And when you stand praying, if you hold anything against anyone, forgive them, so that
your Father in heaven may forgive you your sins.”
24
25

Faith and Philosophy

394

If this solution is viable, it meets several desiderata for a solution to
the problem of divine standing. First, it captures the way in which our
interpersonal wrongs are distinctive wrongs against both another human
and against God. We do not have to deny that when humans wrong each
other that there are two direct victims of those wrongs. This is why God
and our human victim each has direct standing to forgive us (albeit for different wrongs). Second, the solution I offer doesn’t require that one wrong
is the result or consequence of the other, such that either my brother or
God gets the standing to forgive only in virtue of the fact that someone
else was wronged. Third, while I offer a “two-wrongs” solution, it doesn’t
have the consequence that there are wrongs that cannot be forgiven by
God. Fourth, this solution does not rely on any notion of proxy standing.
God does not forgive me for lying to my brother on my brother’s behalf.
God straightforwardly forgives me for lying to my brother on God’s own
behalf.
The trick in pulling off this solution is to give a plausible account of
third party standing to forgive, not just in general, but such that God
could possess it with respect to the wrongs we do to others. Because this
is, as I see it, the biggest hurdle, I will proceed as if it is unproblematic that
human victims have direct standing to forgive us for our wrongs against
them and that God has direct standing to forgive us for our wrongs
against God. This is not actually the case, of course. These are difficult
questions in their own right and any complete solution to the problem of
divine standing of the sort I defend here will have to say something about
each of them. But for now, I will simply focus on giving an account of
God’s third party standing to forgive.
That agents can possess third party standing is far from obvious. In
fact, the Lucy case with which we began might suggest that it is downright counter-intuitive. We need some kind of argument for its palatability.
Let us begin by considering one such argument by Glen Pettigrove.26 His
strategy first identifies a plausible account of the nature of forgiveness.
According to Pettigrove, we can forgive a wrongdoer by (a) overcoming
hostile reactive attitudes provoked by the wrongdoing, (b) restoring a
relationship disrupted by the wrongdoing, and (c) reassessing the wrongdoer’s moral character. The argument for third party forgiveness then
proceeds as follows:
1.

If an agent accomplishes (a–c), then she has forgiven.

2.

Agents other than the victim can accomplish (a–c).

3.

Therefore, agents other than the victim can forgive.27

This is a simple, clever, straightforward argument: because victims can forgive by accomplishing (a–c), then non-victims can do so as well. Standing
26
27

Pettigrove, “The Standing to Forgive”; Forgiveness and Love.
Pettigrove, Forgiveness and Love, 34.
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to forgive is built right into the very conditions on successful forgiveness.
Suppose you blow up my best friend’s car. I take up hostile reactive attitudes, disrupt my relationship with you, and think less of your character.
However, were I to overcome these attitudes, restore our relationship, and
reassess your character (say, after your sincere apology, remorse, and restitution), then I would have forgiven you for torching my friend’s car. Third
party forgiveness is therefore established.
However, I am not convinced that this argument provides us with the
materials to secure third party standing in general or God’s third party
standing to forgive in particular. The argument doesn’t secure God’s third
party standing in particular because it is unlikely that God forgives by
overcoming hostile reactive attitudes (on the assumption that God cannot
have such attitudes in the first place28). Of course, this is not a criticism of
the plausibility of the argument as it stands; Pettigrove was not using it to
establish God’s third party standing in the first place.
But even if the argument is taken only to support the plausibility of
third party standing in general, I think the critic has a reply open to her.
The problem is not premise (2); I do think that agents other than the victim
can accomplish (a–c). And there is an important sense in which I do not
deny premise (1). Although I am not convinced that one can forgive by accomplishing (a–c), I am happy to grant this point for the sake of argument.
The problem with premise (1), however, is that it obscures an important
distinction concerning the conditions on forgiveness.
To see the problem, notice that Pettigrove claims that accomplishing
(a–c) is sufficient for forgiveness (even if accomplishing neither (a), (b),
nor (c) is individually necessary for forgiveness). I think Pettigrove has
in mind what we can call a set of sufficient constitutive conditions on an
instance of forgiving. These are the conditions that attach to the various
behaviors or attitudes that the putative forgiver exhibits in forgiving. To
put matters crudely, the constitutive features of forgiveness are those
things that the putative forgiver “does” when she forgives. It is in this
sense that I am happy to grant that Pettigrove identifies a set of features
that is sufficient for forgiveness.
However, just because an agent meets sufficient constitutive conditions
on forgiveness, this does not mean that she forgives. This is because an
agent may fail to satisfy another kind of condition that is necessary for
forgiveness: an enabling condition. Enabling conditions on forgiveness put
one in a position to forgive in the first place. If enabling conditions are
not met, then even if an agent succeeded in meeting a set of sufficient
constitutive conditions on forgiveness, that agent would fail to forgive.
It is widely thought, for example, that unless someone does something
that is morally wrong (or perhaps morally bad or morally vicious), then
forgiveness cannot take place. Furthermore, it is commonly thought that
forgiveness cannot take place unless the wrongdoer in question was
28

Warmke, “Divine Forgiveness I.”
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morally responsible for her conduct.29 The fact that morally responsible
wrongdoing is an enabling condition on forgiveness explains why we
cannot forgive bears, bees, or babies—they simply aren’t candidates for
forgiveness.
Once we are reminded that there are enabling conditions on forgiveness, we see that simply meeting sufficient constitutive conditions does
not mean that one has thereby forgiven. One might have failed to meet
a necessary enabling condition. Having standing to forgive is a plausible
necessary enabling condition. Here then is the reply open to Pettigrove’s
critic. We cannot show that third parties can forgive simply by showing
that they meet a set of sufficient constitutive conditions on forgiveness
unless we already assume that third parties have standing to forgive (or
perhaps don’t need standing). But this is to beg the question against those
who claim that such parties lack standing to forgive.
Because I am unsure about the soundness of Pettigrove’s strategy for
securing third party forgiveness, I will suggest another kind of strategy
and then apply it to the problem of divine standing. The common and
perhaps even natural way to argue for third party standing involves the
methodology of expanding the class of potential forgivers. This expansion
strategy begins with the assumption that direct victims of wrongdoing
have standing to forgive their wrongdoers. We then provide reasons for
widening the circle of those with standing. The trouble with this strategy
is that arguments for expanding the class of forgivers must begin with
certain standard assumptions about standing, such as the assumption that
one must be the victim of a wrongdoing to forgive one for it. This puts the
burden on the expander to defend third party standing on the home turf
of standard views.
But here is another strategy: assume provisionally that everyone has the
standing to forgive a wrongdoer and then identify reasons for limiting the
class of potential forgivers. This contraction strategy forces us to rethink
why one must have standing to forgive in the first place. Instead of asking,
“What reason is there for letting more people have the standing to forgive
a wrongdoer?” we ask, “Why doesn’t everyone have the standing to forgive a wrongdoer?” I will turn to answering this question shortly, but first
I want to identify two reasons for being amenable both to the contraction
strategy and ultimately to the possibility of third party standing.
First, as Glen Pettigrove points out, “People often say things like, ‘I will
never forgive him for what he did to her,’ or ‘It has taken a very long
time, but I have finally forgiven him for what he did to her.’”30 Suppose,
for example, that I treat my mother very rudely and that my brother personally and deeply cares about both her and me. It strikes me as being
perfectly felicitous if he were to say something like, “It has taken a very
long time, but I have finally forgiven him for what he did to her.” Taken
29
30

For discussion of these assumptions, see Hughes and Warmke, “Forgiveness.”
Pettigrove, Forgiveness and Love, 34.
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at face value, ordinary language gives us some reason to be open to third
party forgivers.
Second, if forgiveness is limited only to victims of wrongdoing, then
there is a curious feature of our moral responsibility practices: there is no
third-person analogue to forgiveness. It is important to keep in mind that
both the victim of wrongdoing and a third party can blame wrongdoers
for the same wrong (e.g., by resenting them, censuring them, altering respective relationships). If I lie to my brother, then both you and my brother can
blame me for doing so. But suppose that both you and my brother give up
your respective blaming stances against me. If only victims have standing
to forgive, then only my brother would count as forgiving me. But what
would we call your pivot away from blame? If it cannot be forgiveness,
what is it? I don’t mean this to be an argument for third party standing.
However, I do think it gives us reason to be open to third party forgivers.31
With the ground softened a bit, I now want to see where the contraction strategy can take us. We begin with the assumption that everyone
has standing to forgive any interpersonal wrong. One way to contract
standing is to ask: What is the complaint we would have against someone
who claimed to forgive but was not appropriately positioned to forgive?
I suggest that the heart of our complaint is not (merely) that the person
is not the victim of the wrongdoing. Rather, the complaint is a more general one: that the person is not appropriately involved in the relationship
between the victim and wrongdoer. If Lucy my new plumber claims to
forgive me for lying to my brother, I think that the appropriate response
is to say that the fact that I lied to him is, as it were, none of her business.
“This is between him and me,” I would say, and if it were true, then I think
I have provided a sufficient reason for thinking that Lucy lacks standing
to forgive me. The crucial point is that I need not advert to the claim that
Lucy was not the victim of my lie to show that she lacks standing to forgive
me. I can advert to a more general explanation: this is not her business.
How, then, does a wrong between persons become “your business?”
One obvious way is if you are the victim of the wrong. But another way
in which a wrong can become your business is if the wrong is done by
someone you personally care about and to someone you personally care
about. Recall the case in which I treat my mother very rudely, and suppose that my brother personally cares about each of us. Suppose he were
eventually to tell me, “It has taken a very long time, but I have finally
forgiven you for what he did to her.” Complaining that he lacks standing
to forgive me because I did not treat him rudely seems to miss the mark.
But suppose my brother was long-lost, had just finally met my mother and
me, and just recently found out that I treated our mother rudely. Here I
think I would be in the right to say that this isn’t really his business. But
if, on the contrary, he had known me and our mother his entire life and
31
For further discussion of why it is reasonable to start with the assumption that everyone
has standing, see Radzik, “On Minding Your Own Business.”
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cared for each of us deeply, it is much less clear that the same complaint is
sufficient to show that he can’t forgive me.
In the kind of case I have in mind, then, the third party (my brother)
personally cares for both the victim (our mother) and the wrongdoer (me).
This is why he is able to forgive me for wronging her. At minimum, I
think this gives us good reason to allow at least some cases of third party
forgiveness, cases in which the third party has deep personal cares for
both the victim and the wrongdoer.
What are personal cares? To say that S personally cares for P is to say
that S’s relationship with P minimally involves two aspects. First it is to
say that S personally knows P.32 Close friendships, familial relationships,
and marriages typify this kind of personal knowledge. Second, S’s personally caring for P involves S’s seeking P’s objective good. S wants what is
best for P and is invested in this outcome. Without developing an entire
account of what such caring involves, personal cares are best identified by
ostension. Imagine close, loving friendships, familial relationships, and
marriages. Personal cares are things members of those relationships have
for one another.33 Therefore, Lucy would not have standing to forgive me
for treating my mother rudely, but my brother would; she lacks the personal cares that he has.34

For more on knowing persons, see Benton, “Epistemology Personalized.”
Note that both personal cares and the way that wrongs affect one’s relationship with
the wrongdoer come in degrees. One might object, then, that on this view, there is some
grey area about the extent to which one must personally care about a victim (and the extent to which the interpersonal wrong affects my relationship with the wrongdoer) to have
standing. But if this is a problem, it is a problem for commonly accepted views of standing to
forgive in which one receives standing by being the victim of a wrong. This is because there
is a spectrum along which one is counted as a victim of wrongdoing. If I witness someone
slapping a friend and this causes me distress, am I a victim? Suppose I hear about a burglary
in my neighborhood and so feel less safe in my own home, am I a victim? And of course,
there are the cases of indirect victimhood discussed in Section II. Presumably there are grey
areas even on the widely-accepted views about standing. If they are not problems for victimonly views of standing, I cannot see why they are problems for personal care views.
34
An objection might be the following: Stalkers might have these kinds of personal cares,
and so possess the standing to forgive. Yet there is something fishy about Lucy possessing
the standing to forgive me for my lie to my brother because she is my stalker. Here are
three kinds of flat-footed replies. First, we could bite bullets: Insofar as Lucy is a stalker of a
certain sort (she truly does know and personally care for me and my brother), she can forgive
me for the things I do to others. That she is a stalker is irrelevant. Second, we could deny
that stalkers have personal cares in the relevant sense. I said above that personal cares are
typified by relationships of certain sorts: close, loving friendships; familial relationships; and
marriages. Stalking is unlike the other kinds of relationships because stalking relations are
typically not welcomed by the one being stalked. Perhaps, then, for a personal care to give
one third party standing to forgive, the forgiven party must welcome or accept the personal
cares of the third party. A third reply is that for personal cares to give a third party the
standing to forgive, the caring must be appropriate to the kind of relationship one has with
the wrongdoer. If one’s cares for the wrongdoer are inappropriate given the kind of relationship one has with the wrongdoer, then one will not have standing to forgive. Lucy does not
get standing to forgive me even if she has deep personal cares for me because those cares are
not appropriate for the relationship we have with one another. What gives one third party
standing are appropriate personal cares, viz. when one meets the conditions for caring in a
32
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Even if personally caring for both the victim and wrongdoer can give
one standing to forgive, this is only to provide an answer to the identification about standing, not the explanatory question (from Section I).
We may still ask: Why do personal cares for the victim and wrongdoer
give one standing to forgive? To see why, consider the perspective of the
wrongdoer who is asking a third party for forgiveness. After treating my
mother rudely, I might say to my brother, “Please forgive me for treating
mom that way.” Among other things, I am asking that the wrong that I
committed against her not cause harm to our relationship that he will not
allow to be healed. That I’ve wronged someone he cares about harms (or
can harm) our relationship. For him to forgive me for wronging her therefore crucially involves, among other things, allowing his relationship with
me to be healed after my wrongdoing.35
But what work is the relationship of personal care doing in this explanation of his standing to forgive? Suppose instead that the case under
consideration is one where I lie to my brother and the issue is whether
Lucy the plumber can forgive me. Because neither her relationship with
me nor her relationship with him is one of personal care, it is difficult
to see why she would regard my lying to him as something that would
damage her relationship with me. “You’re just a paying client,” she might
say, “whether you lie to your brother or not doesn’t really affect us.” That
Lucy lacks relationships of personal care with both of us explains why this
case is different than the previous one.
It also explains why God can have third party standing to forgive us for
wrongs we do to others. And so here—finally—we can apply our results
to the case of divine standing. Here is the basic picture, no doubt in need
of much further elaboration. If third parties who personally care for both
victim and wrongdoer can have standing to forgive the wrongdoer then a
fortiori God can as well. This is because there is no agent who personally
cares more for a victim and wrongdoer than does God. When we wrong
others, this causes damage to our relationship with God. And because God
is in relationships of personal care with both us and our victims, this gives
God standing to forgive us. This distinctive divine third party forgiveness
is God’s way of not allowing our wrongs against others to harm or destroy
our relationship with God.
Here’s an objection. One goal of the paper has been to show that there
are no wrongs that God cannot forgive. Suppose I’ve shown this. You
way that is not inappropriate to the relationship between the parties. I thank Mark Murphy
for raising the stalker case and for suggesting this third way of replying to it.
35
It may be objected that by admitting that my wrongdoing harmed my relationship with
my brother, I have thereby wronged him and so he is a victim of one sort or another and
that therefore I have smuggled direct or indirect standing through the back door. But simply
damaging or harming a relationship does not mean that anyone was wronged. I have moved
away from close friends. This harmed our relationship. But my moving and damaging those
relationships did not itself mean that I morally wronged those friends. Breaking up with a
partner also damages a relationship, but breaking up with a partner does not itself entail
moral wrongdoing.
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might still worry that after God has done all the forgiving that God can do,
there remains forgiveness that has not been accomplished that one should
want to occur. Suppose that God third party forgives me for lying to my
brother. If my brother does not forgive me, then there is still “leftover”
forgiveness that has not been accomplished. So, here’s the objection: if part
of the motivation for showing that God can forgive interpersonal human
wrongs is the conviction that there are no wrongs that God cannot forgive,
isn’t it a weakness of my proposal that it permits unaccomplished acts of
forgiveness?36
One response is the following. Once you have God’s forgiveness for
every wrong you have committed, you do not need forgiveness from
anyone else, including the victim. But this is mistaken. Interpersonal
human forgiveness between victim and wrongdoer accomplishes many
good things: the overcoming of anger and bitterness on the part of the
victim, the rebuilding of trust and restoration of a relationship, and the
equalizing of a moral relationship between victim and wrongdoer. These
things cannot be accomplished by God’s forgiveness, and they are valuable in addition to God’s third party forgiveness for those same wrongs. In
fact, interpersonal human forgiveness is so important that in the Christian
tradition it is commanded.37 Therefore, we cannot dismiss so easily the
importance of forgiveness that may still be accomplished even after God
has forgiven all the possible wrongs there are to forgive.
The correct reply to this objection is simply to point out that a full
theory of the economy of forgiveness, at least in the Christian tradition,
will preserve two thoughts: (1) that there are no wrongs that God cannot
in principle forgive; and (2) that interpersonal human forgiveness is so important that it is commanded. We should preserve (1) because there is no
wrongdoing for which one cannot approach God and request forgiveness,
knowing “he will forgive our sins and purify us from all our wrongdoing.”
(1 John 1:19, emphasis added) We should preserve (2) because there are
uniquely good things that only human interpersonal forgiveness can
achieve. A view that allowed for some wrongs to be outside the reach of
God’s forgiveness would contravene (1). On the other hand, claiming that
once God forgives no other forgiveness needs to take place would contravene (2). The theory I have presented preserves both (1) and (2). There
are no wrongs that God cannot forgive and yet there are still some acts
of forgiveness only other humans can accomplish. God’s forgiveness can
achieve things that human forgiveness cannot and vice versa. We should
not be worried that there are remaining acts of human forgiveness that can
and should take place, even after God has done all the forgiving that God
can do. This is precisely what a theory should say.

36
37

I am grateful to Mark Murphy for pressing this point.
See n. 17 above.
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VI. Conclusion
Many questions remain. I have not explained how exactly it is that
wronging one person can harm one’s relationship with a third person. Nor
have I discussed cases in which a third party has a relationship of personal
care with only the victim (or the wrongdoer). Nor have I said much more
about the nature of divine forgiveness than that it involves not allowing an
interpersonal wrong to harm or destroy one’s relationship with God. There
is also much more to be said about personal cares and how they secure
standing to forgive. But for those who think the problem of divine standing
is a real puzzle and are dissatisfied with conceding that there are some
things God cannot forgive, I have sketched a strategy that secures God’s
standing to forgive us for our wrongs against God and our wrongs against
others. Further, this strategy does so using three plausible premises about
God: (1) that God personally cares for all of us; (2) that God’s relationship
with us is damaged when we wrong others; and (3) that God’s forgiveness
involves, at least in part, reconciling that relationship.38
Bowling Green State University

References
Adams, Marilyn McCord. 1991. “Forgiveness: A Christian Model.” Faith and Philosophy 8: 277–304.
Bash, Anthony. 2015. Forgiveness: A Theology (Cascade Books).
Benton, Matthew A. Forthcoming. “Epistemology Personalized.” Philosophical
Quarterly.
Brien, Andrew. 1989. “Can God Forgive Us our Trespasses?” Sophia 28: 35–42. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02789857
Drabkin, Douglas. 1993. “The Nature of God’s Love and Forgiveness.” Religious
Studies 29: 231–238. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412500022228
Geuras, Dean. 1992. “In Defense of Divine Forgiveness: A Response to David
Londey.” Sophia 31: 65–77. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02772354
Griswold, Charles L. 2007. Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration (Cambridge University Press).

38
I am grateful to the Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame,
whose faculty, students, and visiting fellows read and offered illuminating discussion about
this paper in the spring of 2016: Matthew Benton, Michael Bergmann, Max Baker-Hytch,
Liz Jackson, Anne Jeffrey, Rachel Jonker, Jeffrey McDonough, Sam Newlands, Michael Rea,
and Allison Krile Thornton. I am also grateful to the audience at the 2016 Theistic Ethics
Workshop at Georgetown University and to Craig Warmke for discussion about the topic.
Finally, three sets of comments, from two anonymous referees and from the editor, Mark
Murphy, helped me to clarify many points and avoid some errors. This paper is dedicated
to the memory of Marilyn McCord Adams. Professor Adams wrote a paper on Christian
forgiveness which appeared in this journal in 1991. A few months before her death, she told
me she wrote that paper because she was having a difficult time forgiving a colleague, a
reason that seemed to me to be as good as any.
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